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CRIMINOLOGY
GENERAL PREVENTION REVISITED: RESEARCH
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS*
JOHANNES ANDENAES**
THE REVIVAI, OF INTEREST
In a paper written about ten years ago it
was complained that while the general preven-
tive effects of criminal law had occupied a cen-
tral position in the philosophy of criminal law,
in penal legislation and in the sentencing poli-
cies of the courts, it had been almost totally
neglected in the fields of criminology and soci-
ology. It was then stated that practically no
empirical research had been carried out on the
subject.' This was, in fact, the repetition of
similar complaints expressed in a paper written
about fifteen years earlier.2 Between the two
papers no substantial change had taken place,
apart from some research into the effect of the
death penalty on murder rates.
Today the situation has changed dramati-
cally. From the middle of the 1960's a whole
series of research papers on deterrence have
been published, and the number seems to be in-
creasing. Two important books have dealt ex-
tensively with this topic,3 and more are in the
offing.
* This paper was prepared during the author's
stay as Hill Foundation Visiting Professor at the
University of Minnesota, and grew out of a semi-
nar on "Punishment and Deterrence" in the De-
partment of Criminal Justice Studies. The author
would like to express his thanks to the faculty
members and other participants in the seminar for
their stimulating exchange of views. He would
also like to thank his research assistant, Mr. Phil
Bush, who made the work easier in many ways
and helped him to avoid some of the pitfalls of the
English language.
** Professor of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo,
Norway.
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Thus, the problem has at least received seri-
ous attention. Nevertheless, it remains a very
controversial one. As Jack P. Gibbs, one of the
pioneers of modern deterrence research, said in
a conference in 1972:
Judges, policemen, and even lawyers have
expressed puzzlement over my research on the
deterrence question; they apparently view it as
a needless demonstration of the painfully
obvious. But some of my social science col-
leagues seem to view my research as an
attempt to resurrect a discredited and reac-
tionary idea. So we have two camps in the
deterrence issue, and neither one appears to
press for research on the subject4
There is some analogy to the situation in
psychological research on punishment as de-
scribed by Singer.5 For twenty years psycholo-
gists accepted the findings of Skinner (1938)
and Estes (1944) that punishment was ineffec-
tive in eliminating proscribed behavior. Later
research has shown that these conclusions were
wrong. According to Singer, recent work has
repeatedly shown that both non-rewarded and
rewarded behavior can be quickly, completely,
and permanently suppressed by punishment,
provided it is severe enough. It might well be
asked: how could the whole world of psycholo-
gists have been wrong for so long? The an-
swer given is that psychologists are human;
they do not enjoy experimenting with punish-
ment, especially severe punishment, nor is it to
their liking to advocate punishment as a social
tool. Therefore, psychologists performed very
little research on punishment in the two dec-
4 Gibbs, in THE Ecoxomics OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT 115 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1973) [here-
inafter cited as ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT].
5 For further references see Singer, Psychologi-
cal Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 405,
413-14 (1970).
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ades following the work of Skinner and Estes;
instead, they accepted their conclusions without
serious question. In the early 1960's, however,
research on punishment suddenly skyrocketed.
"The reason for this upsurge is not that psy-
chologists have suddenly become hard-boiled;
rather, they have become convinced that
knowledge about punishment has widespread
humanitarian uses." 6
This discussion has not been presented be-
cause it is thought that psychological research
on deterrence has much to offer deterrence
theory; for the opposite is true.7 Nevertheless,
the emotional climate seems to have been much
the same in both fields. For the greater part of
this century a rehabilitative or treatment ori-
ented ideology has been predominant among
progressive and liberally minded people of the
Western world, and most criminologists would
place themselves in this category. The concepts
of punishment and deterrence were looked
upon with distaste as something outdated, pri-
mitive and brutal. The slogan "punishment
(which in this context means threat of punish-
ment) does not deter crime" was therefore
happily accepted on the most tenuous evidence.
During the last ten to fifteen years a re-evalu-
ation of the rehabilitative concept has taken
place. There has come a realization that there
is a large amount of wishful thinking inherent
in this idea. We do not know how to rehabili-
tate offenders; the evidence points unmistak-
ably towards a conclusion that the type of
treatment given them makes very little differ-
ence to the rate of recidivism.8 Nor do we
know when to release an imprisoned offender
in order to maximize his future chances for a
law-abiding life. In short, the ideology of
treatment and rehabilitation gives no basis for
determining the kind of sanction the offender
6 Id. at 414.
7 ANDENAES, The Relevance of Psychological
Research for Deterrence Theory, in PUNISHMENT
AND DETERRENCE 183-89 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE]. See also note
92 infra.
8For surveys of the research findings see R.
HOOD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIIlNOLOGY
(1970); Martinson, What Works?-Questions and
Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUBLIC INTER-
EST 22 (1974); D. LrPoTN, R. MARTINSON & J.
WiLxs, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUA-
TION STUDIES (1975).
should get, and in the case of imprisonment
the length of time he should serve. Moreover,
we have come to understand that arbitrariness
and injustice may be the result if we try to put
the rehabilitative idea into practice. This grow-
ing awareness that the concept of rehabilitation
cannot serve as the basis for a system of crim-
inal justice, makes the inquiry into other aims
of the criminal law all the more crucial.
Much of the discussion on the question of
general prevention has been of an emotional
nature and has not separated the empirical
questions from the value questions.9 One line
of inquiry concerns whether the threat of pun-
ishment works or not, e.g., whether a change
in the risk of detection or the severity of sanc-
tion will make a difference in the crime rate,
and if so, how much difference. Another line
of inquiry concerns whether and how far it is
ethically defensible or politically acceptable to
make use of the threat and punishment mecha-
nism. There may be good reasons for being
emotional on some policy questions, for exam-
ple, those involving capital punishment, corpo-
ral punishment, or severity of sanction. Some
types of penalties will .be rejected in a civilized
society regardless of their effectiveness. But so
far as a deterrent effect on crime is at all con-
sidered to be relevant, an attempt should be
made to take an objective and dispassionate
look at the available evidence before taking
sides on the policy questions. Too often the ap-
proach has been the opposite: people have let
their view on the empirical questions be heav-
ily colored by their policy preferences. In this
respect the research from recent years repre-
sents a new approach, and there has been a
growing sophistication in research designs and
interpretation of the findings.
Most of this research falls into one of three
categories:
(1) Comparison between geographical areas
(cross-sectional research) ;
(2) Comparisons over time ("before and
after research") ; and
(3) Survey research on knowledge and atti-
tudes.
As a fourth category a few experimental stud-
ies of interest could be mentioned. Some re-
9 See PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE, supra
note 7, at 41-44.
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searchers have used a combination of these
methods.
This paper will not attempt to give a com-
plete summary of the research findings.10
Rather, it shall try to give a broad outline of
the developments and seek a tentative answer
to two questions. First, how much new insight
have we gained? Second, how useful is this in-
sight for purposes of criminal policy? Before
this is accomplished, however, some prelimi-
nary questions must be answered.
THE INVASION OF THE ECONOMISTS
A recent development of interest has been
the entrance of economists into the field of de-
terrence discussion and research. 1 In particu-
lar, two aspects of their work deserve com-
ment.
First, they introduce a general view on
crime and crime motivation which contrasts
sharply with the traditional view of sociolo-
gists working in the field. The economists tend
to start from the assumption that crime is the
outcome of a rational choice. To use the words
of Meiselman and Tullock, economists tend to
believe that crime "in most cases is simply a
business oriented economic activity which is
undertaken for much the same reasons as other
types of economic activity." 12 From this point
of departure often follow policy statements.
Meiselmann and Tullock continue: "To reduce
the frequency of crime, economists generally
recommend we raise the costs of crime." 13
It is difficult to see why economists as such
represent any special insight into the psychol-
ogy and motivation of offenders or potential
offenders. To go back to Bentham seems some-
what strange in the latter half of the twentieth
century. The legal profession has often, and
with some justification, been ridiculed for its
simplistic, Benthamite psychology, but we feel
1OSee Tittle, Punishment and Deterrence of
Deviance, in EcoNomics OF CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT, supra note 4, at 85; Tittle & Logan, Sanc-
tions and Deviance: Evidence and Remaining Ques-
tions, 7 LAw & Soc'v REV. 371.
11 For an early and influential paper see Becker,
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
50 J. POL. EcoN. 169 (1968). For a collection of
papers of economists see EcoNomIcs OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 4.
12 EcoNoics OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT,
supra note 4, at preface.
13 Id.
we have advanced toward a somewhat higher
level of sophistication. The psychology of ra-
tional choice may be correctly applied to some
types of crimes, for example white collar crime
and organized crime, while for other types it
seems wide of the mark. To speak of rational
choice in regard to a murder developing out of
a family conflict or a tavern brawl, or in re-
gard to the intoxicated rapist or the juvenile
gang member, does not seem to make much
sense. In fact, it makes about as little sense as
the opposite generalization that "punishment
does not deter crime," a generalization which
implies that criminal decisions-all types of
such decisions-are so different from all other
types of decisions that the risk of unpleasant
consequences is completely left out of consider-
ation. This is a proposition which has become
increasingly unacceptable since research into
unreported crime and white collar crime has
demonstrated that violations of the criminal
law are a widespread and normal phenomenon.
The other contribution of economists lies in
their application of non-experimental, statisti-
cal models and methods developed in their own
field. It seems that econometric theory may
have developed more powerful statistical meth-
ods than most sociologists have at their dis-
posal. There is every reason to welcome their
work in this regard. But, it is believed that an
application of these statistical methods, and the
results arrived at by using them, are not de-
pendent upon the general approach to crime
and crime motivation discussed above. The
same methods could be applied, and the same
results arrived at, by taking a different view of
criminal motivation. It is just a question of
achieving enough sophistication from a statisti-
cal viewpoint. This independence of the statis-
tical work from the general philosophical ap-
proach is essential. If the validity of statistical
research were dependent upon the soundness of
the author's general view of crime, any pro-
ductive discussion would be foreclosed.
Unfortunately, there has not been as much
interaction between sociologists and economists
as might be hoped for. The sociologists have
mostly discussed and criticized the research of
other sociologists, and have rarely undertaken
a critical assessment of the research of econo-
mists, and vice versa. These two streams of re-
[Vol. 66
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In the literature of English speaking coun-
tries deterrence is used as a technical term:
general deterrence to signify the effects of
threat of punishment, special deterrence to sig-
nify the effects of actual punishment on the in-
dividual offender. This paper is concerned only
with general deterrence.
There is one disadvantage in the use of the
terminology. The term "deterrence" in ordi-
nary usage carries the meaning of influencing
by fear. However, it seems to be generally ac-
cepted that the threat and imposition of pun-
ishment may have a motivating influence apart
from the creation of fear, through an expres-
sion of social condemnation of the forbidden
act. Criminal law is not only a price tariff, but
rather also is an expression of society's disap-
proval of a particular act-a disapproval which
may work in subtle ways to influence
behavior.14 Various labels have been used to
characterize these effects-the moral influence,
the educative, the socializing, the attitude shap-
ing, the norm strengthening or norm reinforc-
ing influence, and so on.
15 Opinions vary
strongly in regard to the importance of this
component; it may also be of varying impor-
tance in different cultural settings. Neverthe-
less, few, if any, would disregard it altogether.
Some of the researchers in the field explicitly
state that they construe deterrence in a broad
sense, so as to also include the moral effects.'
6
Others construe deterrence in a more narrow
sense, which is in agreement with the normal
usage.17 Most do not mention the problem at
all, and thus we are left with an ambiguity.
In German and Scandinavian literature this
difficulty is overcome by speaking about gen-
14 See F. ZIMRING & G. HAwxNS, supra note 3;
Andenaes, The Moral or Educative Influences of
Criminal Law, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES 17 (1971); Haw-
kins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative,
Moralizing and Habituative Effects, 1969 Wis. L.
REv. 550 (1969).
15 For convenience the expression "moral ef-
fects" will be utilized in this article.
16 F. ZIMRING & G. HAwxINS, supra note 3, at
77.
'L Gibbs, supra note 4, at 115.
eral prevention instead of general deterrence.
General prevention thus has two components:
the fear component and what has been called
the moral component. It is admitted that this
terminology is not entirely satisfactory either.
From a linguistic point of view general preven-
tion is a rather broad term, which may be con-
strued to include such measures as better
education, anti-poverty programs, psychiatric
counselling, and so on. In Continental discus-
sions, however, this has not created difficulties.
The vagueness disappears when the term "gen-
eral prevention" is used as a kind of shorthand
expression for "the general preventive effects
of criminal law."
The particular terminology used is, of course,
of limited importance when the meanings of
the terms are made sufficiently clear. It has
been my experience that the use of the term
deterrence tends to focus the discussion on the
motivating effects of conscious fear, to the ne-
glect of other aspects of the problem. For this
and other reasons, therefore, in this article I will
speak about general prevention.
It is suspected that the power of the word
over thought is responsible for a neglect of the
moral effects of criminal law in deterrence re-
search. Obviously, it is difficult in research to
distinguish between the two types of effect.
But an awareness of the distinction calls for
the inclusion of other dimensions into the dis-
cussion and interpretation. In this regard, two
points should be mentioned.
First, the consideration of moral effects calls
for a long-term perspective. "[T]he legislation
of one generation may become the morality of
the next." 18 If a substantial part of the impact
of the law is believed to lie in its power to
support and reinforce social norms, one would
not expect rapid changes in crime rates as a
result of less than drastic changes in law or
law enforcement.' 9
Second, deterrence research has been mainly
concerned with the effects of severity and cer-
tainty of sanction. When discussing the moral
effects a third variable may be just as impor-
'sWalker, Morality and the Criminal Law, 11
How. L.J. 209, 214 (1964).
19 For a discussion of the long-term effect of
removing the stigma of criminalization from abor-
tion see Zimring, Of Doctors, Deterrence, and the
Dark Figure of Crime-A Note on Abortion in
Hawaii, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 699, 716-21 (1972).
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tant: the perceived legitimacy of the criminal
justice system and of the particular statute
under examination. To exert a moral influence
the law and the machinery for enforcement of
it must be looked upon as wielding legitimate
authority. An absence of such perceived legiti-
macy may operate on different levels. It may
amount to a wholesale rejection of the present
society, which is viewed as unjust and oppres-
sive. It may refer to the functioning of the
criminal justice system, which is considered
arbitrary and discriminatory. Or it may refer
to the specific criminal prohibition in question;
one can think about the attitudes of college
students towards the marijuana laws or the at-
titudes of organized labor towards anti-strike
legislation. The enforcement of prohibitions
which are looked upon by great segments of
society as illegitimate might provoke anger, re-
sentment and violence instead of the desired
conformity. The "prestige of the law," to use a
pharase coined by the Polish sociologist Pod-
gorecki, 20 may vary from one country to an-
other. There is much to indicate that it is at a
low ebb in present-day America.
The reasons for this can be traced in part to
the racial tensions and feelings of alienation
and frustration found in a large segment of the
black community. In such an atmosphere of
antagonism, any instrument of law enforce-
ment, even a well-justified and lawful arrest,
may be the spark which precipitates an out-
break of violence and disorder, as was the case
with the Watts riot of 1965.21 This lack of re-
spect for the law can also be traced to a wide-
spread distrust of the integrity of political
leadership and law enforcement. For example,
the President's Crime Commission mentions
this in connection with organized crime:
As the leaders of Cosa Nostra and their
racketeering allies pursue their conspiracy
unmolested, in open and continuous defiance of
the law, they preach a sermon that all too
many Americans heed: The government is for
sale; lawlessness is the road to wealth; hon-
20 Podgorecki, The Prestige of the Law, 10
AcTA SocloLoGIcA 81 (1966).
21 See THE PRESIDENT'S Co-ISSloN ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND AMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN
ASSESSMENT 119-20 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT].
esty is a pitfall and morality a trap for
suckers.
2 2
A theory which does not take factors of this
type into account lacks something essential,
and provides a poor basis for policy decisions.
At this point, it should be noted that the ha-
bituative effects of criminal law will not be
discussed in this paper. This is not to deny
that much law-abiding conduct is habitual and
that the threat of punishment plays a role in
this habit formation; it clearly does.
2 3 It is
sufficient to mention the response of drivers to
traffic signals. The process of habit formation
is not on a par with the process of deterrence
and moral persuasion. Habit formation is a
secondary phenomenon. For a habit to be es-
tablished there must first be compliance based
upon other sources, which may be fear of or
respect for the law; the habit is eventually
formed through repetition of the law-abiding
conduct.
Another point of definition and terminology
should also be mentioned here. General deter-
rence (or general prevention) is sometimes de-
fined as the restraining impact which the pun-
ishment of offenders has on others.24 This is
an unfortunate definition, since it concentrates
upon actual punishment in isolation from the
threat of the law. The threat of the law is the
point of departure; from a general deterrence
perspective the main function of actual punish-
ment is to make the threat of the law credible.
If the threat itself is 100 per cent effective,
there will be no place for actual punishment
because there will be no violation, and the case
would fall outside the above-mentioned defini-
tion of deterrence. Moreover, there will always
be a time lag between the enactment of new
penal provisions and the imposition of actual
punishment. For example, take the much dis-
cussed British legislation on drunken driving
which went into effect on October 9, 1967.
22 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISsiON ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 24 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGA-
NIZED CRIME).
23See PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE, supra
note 7, at 7-9, 36; Hawkins, Punishment and De-
terrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habitua-
tive Effects, 1969 Wis. L. Rv. 550 (1969).2
4 See, e.g., Van den Haag & Martinson, Book
Review, 3 CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY 454 (1974).
[Vol. 66
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There was an immediate drop in accident rates
before any criminal proceedings for a violation
could be instituted.
When objections are made to this definition
of general deterrence as the effect of punish-
ment on others, it is not only because the defini-
tion is found to be analytically misleading, but
also because it tends to engender a feeling that
somebody is being sacrificed for the purpose of
instilling fear in others; that the use of the de-
terrence mechanism is, therefore, in some way
unjust or improper. While there are certainly
ethical problems involved in deterrence,2 5 the
answers should not be biased by the use of in-
accurate terminology.
THE DEATH PENALTY CONTROVERSY
Capital punishment was the first and, up to
recently, the only field where research efforts
were made in order to obtain a statistical as-
sessment of the deterrent effect of punishment.
The research in this field goes back to about
1920. It has relied largely on two methods:
comparison of homicide rates in death penalty
and abolitionist states, and comparison of hom-
icide rates in a state before and after abolition
or reintroduction of the death penalty. Re-
cently Bailey has reviewed the previous re-
search and added his own.28 Despite the meth-
odological objections which can be made
against much of the research, it has convinced
most students of the subject that capital pun-
ishment as opposed to life imprisonment has no
discernible effect on the homicide rates. This
means that if there is such an effect, a possi-
bility which it is hard to disprove, it is not of
such magnitude that it is statistically distin-
guishable from all the other factors which
influence homicide rates. Research in other
parts of the world has led to the same
conclusion.
27
Two methodological points should be made
here. If a simple comparison between abolition-
ist and retentionist states is undertaken, the
murder rates are much higher in the latter. Few
25 See Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence,
37 U. CaI. L. REv. 649 (1970) ; F. ZIMRING & G.
HAWxvINs, supra note 3, at 35-50.
2 Bailey, Murder and the Death Penalty, 65 J.
CRIMA. L. & C. 416 (1974).
27 For the British Commonwealth see N.
WALKER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN
237-41 (2d rev. ed. 1968). •
would ascribe this to the use of capital punish-
ment; it is hard to believe that the possibly
brutalizing effect of capital punishment has a
major impact on murder rates. Obviously,
then, other factors influence the picture, for
example a more violent culture in the South,
accounting both for higher murder rates and
less inhibition against the use of capital pun-
ishment. The accepted method has, therefore,
been to compare murder rates of abolitionist
states with neighboring capital punishment
states. The comparisons show no consistent
pattern in favor of the death penalty states; if
anything, the death penalty states seem to have
higher homicide rates than the abolitionist
states.
Most of the research has been concerned
only with the legal possibility of capital pun-
ishment. It can be argued that frequency of ap-
plication may be of greater importance than
such legal possibility. Only Schuessler and
Bailey have tried to relate homicide rates to
the frequency of executions in death penalty
states.28 They both found a slight, but (with
one exception) not statistically significant neg-
ative correlation between execution rates and
homicide rates. This leaves open the possibil-
ity, but far from establishes, that a more
extended use of capital punishment might have
an influence on the murder rate.
The capital punishment studies have been
very important as arguments in favor of the
movement to abolish the death penalty for
murder. Sometimes they have been used as the
starting point for sweeping generalizations
about the futility of punishment as a deterrent.
Such generalizations are obviously unjustified.
For one thing, the studies do not tell about the
deterrent effect of the death penalty as such,
but only about the difference in deterrent effect
between the death penalty and life imprison-
ment, which would be the usual alternative.
When the alternative is so severe, it seems un-
derstandable that the difference may have little
motivating effect, even in the case of premedi-
tated murder. In either case, the murderer puts
his whole future at stake; he gambles on non-
detection. If he is caught, the game is lost.
Moreover, murder is a very special crime, sur-
28 Schuessler, The Deterrent Influence of the
Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952); Bailey,
supra note 26, at 421-23.
1975]
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rounded by strong moral and social taboos, and
often committed in passion or as a way of re-
lieving personal tensions which have become
unbearable. Differences in types of legal pun-
ishment may, therefore, be of less consequence
here than in most other crimes. In addition a
certain contradiction between ends and means
may counteract the moral effect of the supreme
penalty for murder: it seems somewhat incon-
sistent to inculcate sanctity of life by killing
the offender.
For these and other reasons the findings of
the capital punishment research have no valid-
ity outside the investigated field, that is, capital
-punishment for murder under present-day con-
ditions. There is much historical evidence to
show that capital punishment in war, revolu-
tion and similar situations may have a much
stronger effect than any other measure.29 The
main reason is probably that execution is defi-
nitive, whereas a threat of life imprisonment
under the uncertainty of future developments
lacks its normal credibility. That the capital
punishment research does not tell anything
about the relative general preventive effects of
fines, probation or prison sentences for offen-
ses like car theft, drunken driving, tax cheat-
ing or anti-trust offenses is too obvious to
merit any further elaboration.30
It should be noted that the value of these
death penalty studies has recently been ques-
tioned by economists. Tullock describes the
earlier studies as "extremely primitive statisti-
cally," and without articulating his reasoning,
concludes that their findings should not be
given much weight.31 He further reports that
Ehrlich, by using a much more sophisticated
method, has recently demonstrated "a very siz-
able deterrence payoff to the death penalty for
murder." 32 Ehrlich's figures, according to Tul-
lock, indicate that each execution prevents be-
9 See PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE, supra
note 7, at 26-27, 58-59; Meehl, Law and the
Fireside Inductions; Some Reflections of a Clini-
cal Psychologist, 27 J. Soc. ISSUES 65, 73-74
(1971).
30 For a discussion on the need to differentiate
between various types of offenses see PUNISHMENT
AND DETERRENCE, supra note 7, at 10-22,
84-109; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 3,
at 12841.
31 Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 36
PUBLIC INTEREST 103 (1974).
32 Id. at 108.
tween eight and twenty murders. Tullock adds,
however, that the data available for Ehrlich's
study were somewhat inadequate, so not as much
reliance can be put upon his results as would
normally be given to work by such a sophisti-
cated econometrician.3 3 Since at the time of
this writing the study itself had not yet been
published a detailed assessment cannot be
made. Some comments in regard to the un-
solved problems of the cross-sectional research,
which is the favorite method of the economists,
are made in the following section.
RECENT COMPARATIVE RESEARCH
In recent years, the favorite method of re-
search has been to compare geographical units,
mostly the individual states of the United
States, for the purpose of determining the rela-
tion between crime rates and the certainty and
severity of punishment. While classical deter-
rence theory mentioned celerity of punishment
as well as certainty and severity, there appears
to be no research investigating the effects of
celerity on crime rates. On a common sense
level celerity seems to be less important than
certainty and severity in general prevention.
To the public at large the important thing may
be that the machinery of justice grinds, that
the guilty do not escape punishment; whether
it grinds quickly or slowly is of less
consequence.3 4
The pioneers in the sociological field were
Gibbs and Tittle, who conducted independent
investigations at about the same time. Gibbs
compared homicide rates in the various states
with certainty and severity of imprisonment. 35
As a measure of certainty he used the ratio be-
tween the number of persons admitted to a
state prison during 1960 on a sentence for
homicide and the average number of homicides
33 Tullock tells of an earlier work using a quite
different set of statistics and a different method, in
which he arranged to have a graduate student do
a preliminary study of the same issue. His results
showed that each execution prevented two mur-
ders. Here again, however, the data were bad and
the methods were suitable only for a preliminary
explanation. If anything, the great variation be-
tween the figures of Ehrlich and the figures of
Tullock's graduate student indicate the difficulties
of coming to a reliable assessment.
31 For a more detailed discussion see F. Zim-
RING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 247.
35 Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, 48
Soc. ScI. Q. 515 (1968).
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reported to the police in the years 1959 and
1960 (based on the Uniform Crime Reports).
As a measure of severity he used the median
months served on a homicide sentence by per-
sons in a state prison on December 31, 1960.
Utilizing a chi-square analysis he found that
both certainty and severity of imprisonment,
as thus defined, were negatively related to
homicide rates. For example, the average hom-
icide rates for the states which were low both
in certainty and severity of punishment were
over three times the average for states with
high certainty and severity. A comparison be-
tween the relations of certainty and severity to
homicide rates showed that the association was
much greater for certainty. Gibbs was well
aware of the defects of the data and the diffi-
culties of interpretation. He did not, therefore,
consider his findings conclusive, but thought
that they placed in doubt the common assertion
that no evidence exists of a relationship be-
tween legal reactions to crime and the crime
rate.
Tittle used an approach similar to that of
Gibbs, but extended his analysis to include all
seven index crimes (homicide, assault, sex of-
fenses, robbery, burglary, larcency and auto
theft).3 He also used different statistical tech-
niques in his computations. One important differ-
ence in design was that Tittle tried to control the
etiological factors, such as level of urbanization
and education, age and sex composition of the
population. He found a negative relation be-
tween certainty of imprisonment and offense
rate for each of the offense categories, but the
magnitude of the associations ranged from al-
most zero (-.08) in the case of auto theft to
a substantial association in the case of sex of-
fenses (-.57). With regard to severity no as-
sociations with crime rates were found with the
exception of homicide. This exception aside,
"it would seem that severity alone is simply ir-
relevant to the control of deviance," concludes
the author.
3 7
The exception for homicide was somewhat
confusing, since homicide generally is believed
to be an offense where severity of sanction
plays a minor role. Zimring has later shown
that when the United States is divided into re-
38 Tittle, Crime Rates and Legal Sanctions, 16
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 409 (1969).
37 Id. at 416.
gions and conmparisons are made between states
within the same region, the apparent relation
between severity of sanction and homicide rates
disappears.38
The studies of Gibbs and Tittle were the cat-
alysts for a whole series of papers. Gray and
Martin, in a reanalysis of Gibbs' data using
multiple correlation and regression techniques,
found confirmation for the suggestion that
punishment does deter crime, but not that cer-
tainty of punishment is more important than
severity.3 9 They summarized their findings in
this way :40
Our model suggests that halving either cer-
tainty or severity of punishment will tend to
double the crime rate, and vice versa; halving
both will quadruple the crime rate, and dou-
bling both will cut the crime rate to one
fourth its previous value-provided causality
holds, a matter which is not testable with
these data.
This proviso is, of course, crucial.
Chiricos and Waldo, on the other hand,
found according to their own interpretation
"little consistent support for the hypothesis
that rates of crime and the certainty and sever-
ity of punishment are inversely related." 41
Using the same approach as Gibbs and Tittle
they extended the analysis to three points in
time (1950, 1960, and 1963), and tried in addi-
tion to relate changes in rates of crime to
prior changes in the certainty and severity of
38 F. ZIMRING & E. HAwINs, supra note 3, at
260-62; Zimring, Perspectives on Deterrence, supra
note 3, at 86-87. Bean and Cushing, on the
other hand, by using multiple regression techniques
found significant effects of severity as well as cer-
tainty when correcting for regional differences by
analyzing southern and non-southern states sepa-
rately. See Bean & Cushing, Crininal Homicide,
Punishment, and Deterrence: Methodological and
Substantive Reconsiderations, 52 Soc. ScI. Q. 277
(1971). Two different explanations of this contra-
diction can be advanced. It may be that Bean and
Cushing's method of dividing the states into only
two regions (south and non-south) is too primi-
tive. Alternatively, it may be that their regression
analysis gives more information (as they them-
selves state), and therefore is able to uncover re-
lations which do not show up with other methods.
39 Gray & Martin, Punishment and Deterrence:
Another Analysis of Gibbs' Data, 50 Soc. Sci. Q.
389 (1969).
401d. at 394-95.
41 Chiricos & Waldo, Punishment and Crime:
An Examination of Some Empirical Evidence, 18
SocIAL PROBLEMS 200 (1970).
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punishment. The authors found negative corre-
lations between certainty of imprisonment and
the crime rates, but the strength and sta-
tistical significance of the associations varied
greatly not only over offense, but also over
time. Moreover they suspected that the nega-
tive correlations found by Tittle and them-
selves could be a statistical artifact, since the
denominator of the certainty index and the nu-
merator of the deviance index were almost
identical ("crimes known to the -police"). In
conclusion the authors suggested that the data
applied in their own studies, as well as those
of Gibbs and Tittle (Uniform Crime Reports
and National Prisoner Statistics) may be inad-
equate for use in the testing of deterrence hy-
potheses.
These methodological misgivings were
promptly refuted in commentaries by various
authors. 42 And Logan, in a reanalysis of Tit-
tle's data using other statistical methods,43 con-
firmed his findings: there is for all index
crimes a moderate negative relation between
certainty of imprisonment and the crime rate;
this relation may be curvilinear, the curve
being steep at lower levels of certainty and flat
at upper levels of certainty. For severity a
general pattern is more difficult to establish.
There seems to be a negative relation between
certainty and severity, which might conceal
any deterrent effect of severity as such.
In this regard, Bailey and Smith made a
specific effort to examine whether there is, in
fact, an inverse relation between severity and
certainty. 4 For the death penalty such an in-
verse relation is indicated by historical evi-
dence and common sense, and the well known
Connecticut crackdown on speeding shows the
same effect in the field of traffic law. 45 Bailey
and Smith found a slight but fairly consistent
42 Logan, and Bailey, Gray & Martin, On Punish-
ment and Crime (Chiricos and Waldo, 1970): Some
Methodological Commentary, 19 SOCIAL PROBIEMS
280, 284 (1971). See also Bean & Cushing, supra
note 38.
43 Logan, General Deterrent Effects of Impris-
onment, 51 SOCIAL FORcES 64 (1972).
44 Bailey & Smith, Punishment: Its Severity
and Certainty, 63 J. CRIn. L.C. & P.S. 530
(1972).
45 Campbell & Ross, The Connecticut Crack-
dozn on Speeding: Time Series Data in Quwsi-
Experimental Analysis, 3 LAw & SOCIETY Rxv. 33
(1968).
inverse relation between severity and certainty
also for other offenses, as well as between
changes in the levels of these two variables.
Gibbs himself together with Erickson has
reanalyzed his own data using unconventional
techniques. 6 Again negative correlations be-
tween severity of punishment and homicide
rates were found. A new discovery was that
these correlations are stronger with smaller
variations in certainty. The inverse was not
true, however; the negative correlations be-
tween certainty of punishment and homicide
rates were not stronger when variations in se-
verity were smaller. How these findings can
be reconciled in a meaningful way remains an
unsolved problem.
Leaving aside for the moment the question
of direction of causality it is important to em-
phasize two other points which often seem to
get lost in the discussion.
First, the research has not tried to differen-
tiate between the incapacitative and the deter-
rent effect of imprisonment. Imprisonment pre-
vents new crimes for the period of
incarceration. The magnitude of this effect de-
pends on the length of imprisonment and the
criminal propensity of the particular prisoners.
The impact on crime rates by taking out of
circulation a number of offenders who would
have committed new crimes if they were left in
liberty has nothing to do with deterrence. Un-
less we have an estimate of this incapacitative
effect of imprisonment we run the risk of as-
cribing to deterrence an effect which in fact is
due to incapacitation.
Greenberg has made an attempt to assess the
incapacitative effect of imprisonment.47 Using
two different methods he came to the conclu-
sion that cutting the prison population down to
half of its present size (from 200,000 to
100,000) would increase crime rates due to less
46 Erickson & Gibbs, The Deterrence Question:
Some Alternative Methods of Analysis, 54 Soc.
Sci. Q. 534 (1973).
4 D. Greenberg, The Incapacitative Functions
of Imprisonment: Some Estimates, August 1974
(paper presented at the meeting of the Society for
the Study of Social Problems, Montreal, Canada,
August, 1974). Ehrlich also came to the conclusion
that the incapacitative effect of imprisonment may
be small for less serious crimes. See Ehrlich, Par-
ticipation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical




incapacitation by only a small percentage
(somewhere between 0.6 and 4 per cent). If
these estimates are accepted, the incapacitation
factor would not appear to be an important
disturbing factor in deterrence research, al-
though a complete study would require that the
effects of jail terms also be taken into account.
Second, it is important to note that the con-
cepts of "certainty" and "severity" in the re-
search initiated by Gibbs and Tittle are
different from the same concepts as used in de-
terrence theory. In deterrence theory certainty
indicates the risk of being punished, whatever
the sanction might be (a fine, probation, jail,
prison, death). Gibbs, and others following
him, have concentrated exclusively on the risk
of imprisonment, measured by the ratio be-
tween persons admitted to state prisons and
the number of crimes reported to the police. In
Gibbs' study of homicide this was probably of
no great importance, since the penalty here al-
most invariably will be imprisonment (apart
from the relatively few cases which result in
the imposition of the death penalty). For of-
fenses like larceny, burglary and auto theft, on
the other hand, the discrepancy will be very
great, since other dispositions here are so com-
mon. The average risk of imprisonment for
these offenses is very small. Tittle places the
figures at 3.6 per cent, 3.4 per cent, and 1.5 per
cent respectively.48 Differences between states
in regard to this risk may reflect severity in
sentencing as much, or even more, than cer-
tainty of detection and conviction. From the
present data an answer to this cannot be given.
It can only be said that imprisonment rates are
a type of combined measure of certainty and
severity.
Likewise, the definition of severity in the re-
viewed research is not in accord with the same
concept in deterrence research. A comparison
between the length of prison terms served in
different states does not given an overall pic-
ture of the severity of sanction. In one state
there may be a wide use of probation and
fines, and long prison, sentences in the few
cases where prison is used. In another state
there may be a greater use of short jail or
prison sentences. It can be added that the
48 See Tittle, supra note 36, at 416; Logan,
supra note 43, at 69.
practice of indeterminate sentences, leaving to
the parole boards the decision on how much of
a prison sentence will be served, creates a low
visibility of this factor, and therefore probably
a low correspondence between actual and per-
ceived severity.
For these reasons it would be a serious mis-
interpretation of the findings to say that they
indicate that certainty of punishment has a de-
terrent effect whereas it seems doubtful that
severity has such effect. What the research
does suggest is, first that the use of imprison-
ment acts as a deterrent for traditional crimes
and, secondly that differences in the length of
imprisonment, at the levels of use in the
United States, do not seem to have much im-
pact on crime. It would be quite unjustified to
extend this analysis to a choice between, for
example, fines or probation and imprisonment.
This would be the same type of error as ex-
trapolation of the research involving death
penalty for murder to other penalties and other
offenses.
The rates of clearance by arrest no doubt
give a better approximation to certainty of
sanction than do the rates of imprisonment.
Moreover, arrest in itself, although not a pen-
alty in any legal sense, in fact acts as a kind
of sanction, carrying both unpleasantness and
some social stigma. Such arrest rates have
been used in research by Logan and by Tittle
and Rowe.
Logan based his study on arrest rates for
the various states, using unpublished data sup-
plied by the F.B.I. for the years 1964 through
1968.49 He found that certainty of arrest has a
low to moderate negative correlation with the
crime rate for every index crime except homi-
cide. Since the probability of arrest within
each crime category is fairly uniform from
state to state, he justifiably believed that it
would be unreasonable to expect high correla-
tions. Moreover, it is not known how high a
correlation there is between actual risk of ar-
rest and the perceived risk. Modest differences
or changes in risk may go unnoticed. For
some crime categories the probability of arrest
has a higher negative correlation with crime
49 Logan, supra note 43, at 40; C. Logan, Ar-
rest vs. Imprisonment, August 1974 (paper pre,
sented to the American Sociological Association,
Montreal, Canada, August, 1974).
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rates than does probability of imprisonment,
while for others there is a lower correlation. A
search for an explanation of these differences
yields only tentative answers.
Tittle and Rowe compared arrest data for
counties and cities in the state of Florida.50
They found negative correlations between cer-
tainty of arrest and the crime rate, but this
was largely attributable to variations that oc-
curred above a 30 per cent certainty. In the
view of the authors these findings suggest that
certainty of punishment has an important in-
fluence on the degree of conformity that can be
expected in a political unit, but that this influ-
ence does not produce noticeable results until
certainty has reached at least a moderate level.
Since the authors give only aggregate figures
for all index crimes, implying that the deter-
rence mechanism works in the same way for the
different types of crime, one may be doubtful
about the interpretation. Moreover, from the
point of view of the offender the arrest rate
for reported crimes will be less important than
the much lower arrest rate for all committed
crimes.
The really crucial question which has so far
been left aside, is whether the correlations be-
tween sanctions and crime rates can be cor-
rectly considered as evidence of causality. The
problem had been raised by Gibbs, 51 and has
later been discussed by Tittle,52 Logan 53 and
others, but has not yet been solved. Punish-
ment has an impact on crime, but crime also
has an impact on punishment, and this two-
way process may either create a false impres-
sion of a deterrent effect or, on the contrary,
serve to conceal such effects. If crime rates,
for some reason, have increased, this may, for
example, lead to greater use of probation or
fines to reduce overcrowding in prisons, and
thus create an impression that leniency in deal-
ing with offenders is responsible for high
crime rates. But increased crime rates may as
well lead to increased severity in sentencing as
a countermeasure; thus, high crime rates and
high severity may go together, and although
50Tittle & Rowe, Certainty of Arrest and
Crime Rates: A Further Test of the Deterrewe
Hypothesis, 52 SocrAL FORCEs 455 (1974).
51 Gibbs, supra note 35, at 527-28.
z2 Tittle, supra note 36, at 419-21.
53 Logan, supra note 43, at 72-73; C. Logan,
Arrest vs. Imprisonment, supra note 49.
the increased severity may have had a deter-
rent effect this will not show up in the com-
parative analysis.
Furthermore, a third factor, difficult to iden-
tify and measure, may influence both the rate
of crime and the indices of certainty or sever-
ity of sanction. One such intervening variable
is what has been called the -norinative climate
in society.54 If community condemnation of
certain criminal acts is strong, this may lead to
lower crime rates and at the same time to a
greater severity of punishment, thus creating
an impression that the lower crime rate is due
to the severity of punishment. Similarly with
regard to certainty of sanction: a strong com-
munity condemnation could lead to active sup-
port of law enforcement from the citizens and
consequently a higher certainty of detection
and conviction, thus giving the impression that
the high certainty of sanction was the cause of
the low crime rate, whereas the real cause
might be the normative climate as such. But a
severe normative climate may have quite dif-
ferent effects: it may lead to a high percentage
of committed crimes being reported to the po-
lice, thus concealing the possible deterrent ef-
fect of certainty and severity of sanctions. All
these interactions between variables greatly
complicate the interpretation of the findings. It
is not possible on a common sense basis to
state with confidence which way causality goes,
much less to quantify the possible interactions.
As long as these problems are not solved, con-
clusions in regard to deterrent effects can only
be of a tentative nature.
Having reviewed the research of the sociolo-
gists it is now necessary to discuss the econo-
metric research. The literature has assumed
considerable proportions. In a survey dated
February 1974, Morris Silver summarized and
discussed nineteen recent econometric studies. 55
Some of them use the different states as units,
54 Bowers & Salem, Severity of Forinal Sanc-
tions as a Repressive Response to Deviant Behavior,
6 LAw & Soc'Y. Rzv. 427 (1972) ; Salem & Bowers,
Severity of Formal Sanctions as a Deterrent to
Deviant Behavior, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 21 (1970).
Tittle, supra note 36, and Logan, spra note 43,
speak about normative consensus.
55 M. Silver, Punishment, Deterrence, and Po-
lice Effectiveness: A Survey and Critical Interpre-
tation of the Recent Econometric Literature, Feb-
ruary, 1974 (a report prepared for the Crime
Deterrence and Offender Career Project).
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others use smaller units (cities, counties, police
precincts) within one state. All of them dis-
cuss the impact of certainty of punishment, and
a few also discuss the impact of severity. Be-
cause of the technical complexity of the statis-
tical methods it is difficult for a non-statistician
to form a personal opinion on the content and
soundness of the built-in assumptions and the
strength of the findings.
The basic technique of these econometric
studies consists of constructing a Crime Gener-
ation Function, expressing the crime rate as a
function of a set of explanatory variables, in-
cluding the risk of punishment. Actual or esti-
mated figures from available statistics are in-
serted into the equation and coefficients for the
different variables are computed. Among the
factors included may be, for example, the per-
centage of non-whites in the population, in-
come inequality, police density and other fac-
tors which the author considers important. The
methods of statistical manipulation vary from
one study to another. The technique offers
some possibilities for studying the interaction
between crime and law-enforcement activities
through simultaneous estimation techniques.
Only two especially elaborate and interesting
papers will be mentioned here. Ehrlich com-
pared the different states in the United States,
and used measures of certainty and severity of
imprisonment similar to those of Gibbs and
Tittle.5 6 He found, with virtually no exception,
that the rate of specific crime categories varies
inversely with the probability of imprisonment
and the average length of time served in state
prisons. He tried to separate the effect of inca-
pacitation from the effect of deterrence, and
concluded that an independent deterrent effect
of law enforcement appears to be confirmed.57
Ehrlich further attempted to assess the effec-
tiveness of law enforcement in combating
5GEhrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activi-
ties: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,
supra note 47. See also Ehrlich, The Deterrent
Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 259 (1972).
57 Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activi-
ties: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,
supra note 47, at 535-37, 553; Ehrlich, The De-
terrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement,
supra note 56, at 267-69. But see the criticism by
M. Silver, supra note 55, at 19-20, 49: this evi-
dence "is much too tenuous to justify conclusions
concerning an issue so vital."
crime by asking: is there too much or too little
enforcement (based on 1965 figures) ?58 His
tentative estimate was that a I per cent increase
in expenditure on direct law enforcement would
result in about a 3 per cent decrease in all felony
offenses. Comparing the total social loss from
these crimes with the cost of law enforcement,
this would mean that expenditure on law en-
forcement was less than optimal: each extra
million dollars spent on law enforcement would
reduce the loss from crime by several million
dollars. Ehrlich states, however, that this result
cannot be considered very reliable-a statement
with which it is easy to agree.
Kobrin and associates used counties within
one state (California) as units of measure-
ment.59 In their analysis of the relation-
ship between crime rates and severity and cer-
tainty of sanction, the fifty-eight counties were
divided into four categories according to size,
and seven factors indexing social characteris-
tics of the county (poverty, ethnic composition,
age composition, etc.) were taken into account.
The methodology used was simple correlation
analysis. Besides the crime rate (ratio of felo-
nies to population) a crime level index was
computed, using the Sellin and Wolfgang scale
for weighting the seriousness of various offen-
ses. As a result of their analysis it was found
that about half of the variation in crime rates
between the counties could be charged to the
social factors which were taken into account,
and approximately one-third to the activities of
the criminal justice system, with the balance
contributed by unknown factors. Further, it
was found that the relative effect of justice
agency operations on crime was greater in
counties with larger rather than smaller popu-
lations. The meaning of these findings, if ac-
cepted, is that the activities of criminal justice
agencies "remain a substantial and significant
force in determining the rate and seriousness
of felony offenses, the more so the larger the
population of the jurisdiction." 60
58Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activi-
ties: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,
supra note 47, at 556-59.
59 S. Kobrin, E. Hansen, S. Lubeck & R. Yea-
man, The Deterrent Effectiveness of Criminal
Justice Sanction Strategies. Summary Report,
September, 1972. (Public Systems Research In-
stitute, University of Southern California).
60 Id. at 16.
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The most interesting feature of the research
is the attempt to refer the variation to differ-
ent stages of the criminal process (the police,
pre-trial, conviction and sentencing stages).
The three first stages refer to the certainty of
sanction, whereas the sentencing stage refers
to severity. For each stage a formula for sanc-
tion level was devised. For the police stage the
computation was based on the ratio of arrests
to the number of felonies reported. For the
sentencing stage the various alternatives were
weighted, somewhat arbitrarily, in a gradient
from a fine, carrying a weight of 0; probation,
1; jail plus probation, 2; jail only, 3; prison,
4; and death penalty, 5. Data on length of sen-
tence were not available and hence were not
included. It is worth noting that the measure
of severity of sanction in this research was
quite different from the measure of severity in
the comparative studies which used the various
states as units. There, length of prison term
was the only measure of severity, whereas this
factor is not included at all in the California
study. This is, of course, a weakness, but on
the whole the measure of severity in the Cali-
fornia study gives a better measure of severity
in sentencing practice for the less serious felo-
nies. For crimes like homicide and rape, where
imprisonment is almost always applied, the re-
verse may be true.
The analysis ascribes the greatest
explanatory power to the police and the sen-
tencing stage, but the pattern varied markedly
with the size of the county. "This suggests at a
minimum that jurisdictions of different social
composition may distribute the responsibility of
sanction imposition among their justice agen-
cies in quite different ways." 61
The study shows that comparisons of units
within one state offer possibilities of analysis
which the state figures of the Uniform Crime Re-
ports and the National Prison Statistics do not
provide; nevertheless, there are aspects of the re-
search which create doubt about these conclu-
sions. For example, the study operates with
aggregate figures for all index crimes and not
figures for the different crimes; it has not ad-
dressed itself to the problem of separating de-
terrence and incapacitation. Further, it has not
61 Id. at 24.
discussed the problem of the direction of cau-
sality.
Morris Silver, after reviewing the econo-
metric research, concludes: "Taken as a whole,
the evidence convincingly demonstrates that
crime rates are reduced by higher probabilities
of punishment." 62 Since simultaneous estima-
tion techniques have been employed, the nega-
tive relationship cannot be attributed to the
possibility that unanticipated increases in the
crime rate, caused by spreading law enforce-
ment resources too thinly, will bring about a
decline in the probability of arrest and con-
viction. "The results for length of sentence
point in the same direction as those for proba-
bility of punishment, but not as convincingly.
Greater caution is justified for a number of
reasons." 63
With regard to future research, Silver be-
lieves that the major obstacle to the further
advancement of knowledge in the area of crim-
inal behavior is the absence of refined data
rather than the absence of refined theoretical
models. The growing availability of data, for
example, on actual as opposed to recorded of-
fenses, subjective as opposed to recorded prob-
abilities of apprehension and severity of pun-
ishment, and the criminal records and histories
of population groups, will make it possible to
accurately estimate parameters and test hy-
potheses regarding incapacitation, rehabilita-
tion, general prevention, anti-poverty pro-
grams, etc. From this will follow an increase
in the number of meaningful policy recommen-
dations.
It is difficult to feel convinced that this opti-
mism is justified. For one thing, the data Sil-
ver is asking for may be extremely difficult
and costly to obtain. Further, a convincing
method of separating incapacitative effects
from general preventive effects has not been
established. It is also hard to believe that pa-
rameters will be the same in states of very dif-
ferent social composition and cultural tradi-
tions, and that they will remain constant over
time in a society undergoing rapid change.
Perhaps even more important, it seems as if
62 M. Silver, supra note 55, at 30.
63 Id. at 30. In the interpretation of these state-
ments it should be born in mind that in the econo-
metric as in the sociological research punishment
mostly stands for imprisonvient. See note 48 supra.
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the causality problem has been only partially
solved, and that for this reason competing ex-
planations of covariation cannot be ruled out.
In a previous paper it was said about com-
parisons between geographic areas: "In order
to draw definite conclusions we need areas
with similar social conditions but drastic dif-
ferences in legal systems, and such areas are
difficult to find." 11 This was probably an un-
derestimate of the potentialities of modern sta-
tistical methods. Nevertheless, an uneasy doubt
remains in the mind of the non-statistician
about the meaningfulness of comparing units
so fundamentally different as rural states like
South and North Dakota with states dominated
by great metropolitan areas.
Two limitations of the comparative research
of the sociologists and economists should be
mentioned. The research has been confined to
the seven index crimes. This covers the bulk
of what is generally called "the crime prob-
lem," but it does not touch on such important
issues as narcotics, public drunkenness, white
collar crime, and organized crime. The find-
ings can hardly be generalized in regard to
such offenses, and these other offenses would
be difficult to reach with the same techniques.
Another inherent limitation is this: The
comparative research takes advantage of geo-
graphical variations in the functioning of the
criminal justice system. In an ideally working
criminal justice system there would be no dis-
parities in sentencing. Severity of sanction
would, under similar circumstances, be uniform
across the different jurisdictions in the same
political unit. If this were the case, differences,
for example, between counties in California
with regard to severity of sentence, would be
ascribable to unknown differences in the com-
position of convicted offenders. Thus, in a per-
fectly functioning system we can expect a zero
correlation between severity of sanction and
crime rates. Whatever positive or negative cor-
relations might be found would be spurious.
To a certain degree, this would be true also
for certainty of sanction, since it seems reason-
able to adjust the input in law enforcement so
as to achieve a similar certainty of punishment
in different jurisdictions. It would, of course,
64 PUNISHiENT AND DETERRENcE, supra note 7,
at 67.
be a mistake to conclude from such zero corre-
lations that severity or certainty of sanction
has no impact on crime. In the United States
today, discrepancies both across state borders
and within the same states seem to be of such
magnitude that they can be used as the basis of
research. On the other hand, within countries
with less disparity in sentencing and law en-
forcement, such as the Scandinavian nations,
comparative studies using, for example, cities
or counties as units, could not be expected to
yield interesting results.
The planning and interpretation of compara-
tive research is a difficult enterprise. The ideal
qualifications of the researcher would be three-
fold: a high degree of statistical sophistication,
a similarly high degree of knowledge of the
theories and facts of criminal behavior, and
thorough knowledge of how the machinery of
criminal justice works. Since these qualifica-
tions can hardly be expected to be present in a
single individual, teamwork seems essential,
with each member of the team being suffi-
ciently familiar with other aspects of the prob-
lem to participate in a productive exchange of
information and viewpoints.
COMPARISON OvER TIME
The most straightforward method of explor-
ing the effects of a change in legislation or en-
forcement on the rate of crime is the "before
and after" research. It is a reasonable proposi-
tion that no major change of policy should be
undertaken without an effort to ascertain the
effects of the change. But this task is not as
easy as it may sound.65 First, of course, there
is the difficulty in identifying the impact of the
change among all the other factors which have
been involved at the same time. Only abrupt
and major changes can be expected to give
clear statistical evidence of the effects, and
preferably, there should be high enough figures
to rule out the confounding effect of chance.
Even so there are many pitfalls. One is the
so-called phenomenon of regression to mean. A
change in legislation or enforcement can be the
response to a rising crime rate. If the crime
rate decreases after the change in policy, this
05 For a detailed discussion see E. ZIMrING & G.
HAwxINs, supra note 3, at 270-91; Campbell, Re-
form as Experiments, 24 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 409
(1969) ; Campbell & Ross, smpra note 45.
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is easily attributed to the change in policy,
whereas the study of a longer time series may
suggest that what has happened is the return
to a more normal rate which might have hap-
pened anyway.
A second pitfall is related to the large vol-
ume of unreported crime. The publicity accom-
panying the change in policy may have an
impact on the tendency of the public to report
the crime in question, thus making the number
of reported crimes a misleading measure of the
effect on crime rates. This difficulty can, to
some degree, be overcome by the use of careful
victimization studies undertaken both before
and after the reform is put into effect. In other
cases there may be available a measure of the
effects which is independent of reported crime
rates, for example, accident rates following
changes in traffic legislation.
Having pointed out the possible pitfalls, it is
now necessary to discuss a few important be-
fore-and-after studies from recent years. For
example, Barry Schwartz examined the effect
in Philadelphia of increased penalties for
rape.66 On Palm Sunday, 1966, Philadelphia
was shaken by an exceptionally brutal case of
rape. Three men broke into a house, raped and
mistreated an eighty-year-old widow, her for-
ty-four-year-old daughter and fourteen-year-old
granddaughter. After the rape the house was
ransacked and looted. The grandmother later
died from her wounds. The legislature acted
quickly to increase penalties for rape, with
both political parties trying to gain political
advantage from the issue in the upcoming May
elections. On May 12, 1966, the new statute
was signed by the governor. For rape without
injury the maximum penalty was raised from
fifteen to twenty years, for rape with bodily in-
jury the maximum sentence was increased from
fifteen years to life imprisonment, and there was
set a minimum sentence of fifteen years. During
the preparation of the bill high expectations
were expressed with regard to deterrent effects
on potential rapists.
So far the pattern was a rather familiar one.
What was unusual was that a sophisticated re-
search effort was made to assess the effects of
66 Schwartz, The Effect in Philadelphia of
Pennsylvania's Increased Penalties for Rape and
Attempted Rape, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 509
(1968).
the legislation. The findings were very clear:
in the months after enactment of the law there
were the usual variations in rape rates from
month to month, but nothing to indicate a de-
crease due to the new legislation or the public-
ity accompanying it. Though the author is
very cautious in his findings, and does not
make any sweeping generalizations, he states
that we are "bound to conclude that Pennsyl-
vania's new deterrent strategy against rape
was a failure as far as Philadelphia is
concerned." 67
Before drawing any conclusions from this
study, a few caveats should be made. First, the
research was directed towards short term ef-
fects. This does not rule out the possibility of
a long term effect. Second, it is not known
how far the new legislation has changed the
actual pattern of sentencing. Third, it is not
known whether the publicity concerning the
Palm Sunday rape and the subsequent legisla-
tion has led to an increased tendency among
the victims of rape to report the crime. If this
were the case unchanged figures of reported
rapes would mean a smaller number of com-
mitted rapes. Since victimization studies indi-
cate that only one out of four rapes is reported
to the police, 8 a change of attitude in the vic-
tims could easily conceal even a strong
deterrent effect.
Despite these theoretical possibilities the
study strongly suggests that for a crime like
rape, an increase in the already very severe
threat of punishment cannot hope to achieve
much in the way of deterrence. Those who are
not deterred by a threat of fifteen years, but will
be deterred by a threat of twenty years, must be a
very small group indeed. It would, however, be
unjustified to apply this generalization to other
crimes and other levels of punishment. This
would be a mistake similar to previous gener-
alizations made in the death penalty research.69
Other recent "before and after" studies re-
late to the important problem of driver
behavior.7 0  Chambliss interviewed faculty
67 Id. at 514.
6 8 TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT,
supra note 21, at 12.69 See text accompanying notes 28 and 29 supra.
70 For an excellent discussion of the previous
research see Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal




members to find out how they reacted to an in-
crease in fines and more stringent enforcement
of parking regulations on a University
campus.71 He found, not surprisingly, that for
some of the faculty members severity and cer-
tainty of sanction had an impact on their be-
havior. The most important and well studied
experience in deterrence of undesirable driver
behavior is represented by the British Road
Safety Act of October 1967, which made it an
offense to drive with a blood alcohol concen-
tration of .08 per cent or morej 2 The penalty is
normally a fine and loss of license for one year on
the first offense. From the day the new legisla-
tion went into effect there was a considerable
drop in highway casualties as compared with
previous years. For the first three months cas-
ualties were 16 per cent lower than the preceding
year, and deaths were down by 23 per cent. Espe-
cially impressive were the figures for late
night hours, weekends and Christmas days-in
short, the periods where the combination of
drinking, and driving is most frequent. Be-
tween 8 p.m. and 4 a.m. the reduction of cas-
ualties compared with the same months in 1966
was 36 per cent in October, 38 per cent in No-
vember and 41 per cent in December. Moreover,
the proportion of deceased drivers, who by post
mortem examination were found to have blood
alcohol concentrations above the limit, dropped
sharply. In short, there could be no reasonable
doubt that the law had a considerable effect on
driver behavior and traffic accidents.
Unfortunately it seems that most of the ef-
fects have gradually been lost. Of course, as
time passes, it becomes increasingly difficult to
isolate the effects of the law, and the evidence
is not entirely unambiguous in this regard.
The official commentaries to the British Road
Accident statistics mention that casualties be-
tween 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. in 1971 were down
by 18 per cent from the 1966 level compared with
8 per cent at all other hours, and that this suggests
71 Chambliss, The Deterrent Influence of Prn-
ishment, 12 CRIME & DEI.NQUENcY 70 (1966);
Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effective-
tess of Legal Sanctions, 67 Wis. L. REv. 703
(1967).
72 For a detailed and informative discussion of
the law, its enforcement and effects see Ross,
Law, Science, and Accidents: The British Road
Safety Act of 1967, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1973).
See also Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific
Offenses, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 537 (1971).
that the drinking and driving legislation was
still having a very substantial effect in 1971.73
But it is difficult to disagree with Ross's con-
clusion that the benefits produced by the legis-
lation had largely been canceled by the end of
1970.74 Strong support for this conclusion is
found in the fact that the proportion of drivers
killed in road accidents with more than the
prescribed limit of blood alcohol, which had
gone down from 25 per cent prior to the law to 15
per cent after the law, in 1971 had regained its
former 25 per cent level. Even for the hours be-
tween 10 p.m. and 4 a.m. the figures have returned
to their pre-law level.75
The explanation for this declining effect can
be traced to lack of enforcement, according to
Ross. The publicity accompanying the law had
given the public exaggerated and quite unreal-
istic ideas about the risk of apprehension and
conviction. But little effort was made to en-
force the law; the police did not perceive the
law as defining an important task, and gradually,
the public learned that they had overestimated
the risk.76 Thus, the experiences with the Brit-
ish drunken driving law have demonstrated
first that it is -possible, at least in some fields,
to change behavior by the threat of punish-
ment, and secondly that an initial success will
not endure if there is not sufficient enforce-
ment to make the threat credible.
77 "
7
s HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, ROAD
ACCIDENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN XII (1973).
74 Ross, supra note 72, at 77.
5 See P. CODLING & P. SAmsoN, BLOOD-ALCO-
HaL IN ROAD FATALITIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE
ROAD SAFETY AcT, 1967 (1974).
76 Ross, supra note 72, at 76. See also PUNISH-
MENT AND DETERRENCE, supra note 7, at 100-102.
7 7 The Dutch professor Buikhuisen, who is ex-
tremely critical of the use of official crime data
in research, made an interesting experimental study
choosing, as a type of offense which was easy to
observe, the violation of the prohibition against
driving a car with worn tires. Buikhuisen, General
Deterrence: Research and Theory, 14 ABsTRAcrs
ON CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 285 (1974). The
design was simple: through cooperation with the
police and press, a much publicized police drive to
control cars with worn tires took place in the
Dutch town of Groningen. A similar town, Leeu-
warden, was used as a control where no extra
police activity on publicity took place. After a cam-
paign lasting two weeks, previously observed cars
with worn tires were sought out and inspected to
see how many now had new tires. The result was
54 per cent renewal in Groningen compared with




Survey research can be of interest to the
theory of general prevention in several re-
spects. Perhaps the simplest is to collect data
on public knowledge and beliefs about the sys-
tem of criminal justice. The motivating effects
of criminal law do not depend upon the objec-
tive realities of law and law enforcement, but
upon the subjective perception of these reali-
ties in the mind of the citizen. A change which
is not noticed can have no effect. A Finnish
research experiment gives a good illustration.
78
In three middle-sized towns in Finland the po-
lice agreed to reduce the number of fines for
public drunkenness from a level of 40 per cent to
50 per cent of arrested drunken persons to a level
of about 10 per cent to 25 per cent. In three simi-
lar towns, which served as controls, previous
practice went unchanged. It was found that the
reduced application of fines did not seem to have
any influence on the amount of public drunken-
ness, as measured by arrests. By participant ob-
servation and police questioning it was estab-
lished that even the chronic offenders had not
noticed the policy change. Those who were not
fined had just praised their good luck. The lack of
any effect on arrest rates thus had a very nat-
ural explanation: the change in police practices
had been of such low visibility that it went un-
noticed even among those most affected by the
change.
This aspect did not attract much attention in
the classical theory of deterrence. It seemed to
be tacitly assumed that there would be an ac-
cord between objective facts and subjective
perceptions. Recent research has tried to shed
some light on this question. The relationship
between facts and perceptions may be more
complex in the United States than in most
other countries due to the great mobility of the
population and the extensive mass media coy-
be ascribed to the general preventive effect of the
action.
Buikhuisen considers the controlled experiment
as the only way to test hypotheses on general pre-
vention, with the main problem being to persuade
criminologists to collect their own data. However,
there are few fields where experiments of the worn
tire type can be made in a criminal justice setting.
And other experiments are more often than not
so far from real life as to be of little relevance.
78 T6rnudd, The Preventive Effects of Fines for
Drunkenness, 2 SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN CRIMI-
NOLOGY 109 (1968).
erage of crime and the criminal justice system
across state borders. These circumstances tend to
lower the probability that the general public will
have a clear perception of the situation in one
particular state. Also the plea-bargaining prac-
tice and the wide use of indeterminate sentences
make it difficult for the average citizen to know
how the criminal justice system really works.
One of the best known and most often
quoted studies on public awareness of criminal
penalties was conducted in California by Doro-
thy Miller and associates.79 They found that
the level of awareness in the general popula-
tion concerning the maximum penalties for dif-
ferent crimes was very low. Using this fact
and starting from an assumption that, "If pen-
alties are to deter, we must assume that mein-
bers of society know what the penalties are," 80
they attempt to demonstrate that since knowl-
edge of penalties is so -poor, deterrence cannot
work. They found that criminals have a better
knowledge of penalties than does the general
population, inferring from this that penalties
become of interest to a person only after he
engages in criminal behavior. People engage in
crime and learn of the penalties not as deter-
rents but only as factors of a criminal career
to be faced after the act.
Even apart from the fact that knowledge of
maximum penalties probably is less important
than knowledge of actual levels of sentencing,
these inferences are clearly unjustified. It is
necessary to distinguish between the scope of a
criminal -provision and the penalties prescribed
for violation. The penal provision must be
known, or at least suspected, if it is to have a
deterrent effect. But with regard to the penal-
ties no exact knowledge is required. When a
man moves to another state, he will normally
have no knowledge either of maximum penal-
ties or of the sentencing practices in that state,
but this does not mean that he is less moti-
vated to abstain from crime. He has a general
idea of the seriousness of different crimes and
a vague feeling of what unpleasant conse-
quences can be expected in case of arrest and
" Miller, Rosenthal, Miller & Ruzek, Public
Knowledge of Criminal Penalties: A Research
Report, in DEmNT EmzcTs OF CRIMINAL SANC-
TIONS, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE ASsEMBLY COM-
MITTIz oN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1968).80 Id. at 11.
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conviction. Whether a lack of precise knowl-
edge of penalties increases or decreases the de-
terrent effect depends on whether the person
in question overestimates or underestimates the
severity of sanction.
More important are the findings in the
Miller study about the awareness of a change
in penalties. The California legislature had in
1967 increased penalties for rape, robbery, and
burglary, where great bodily injury was in-
volved. The minimum for all these crimes was
increased to fifteen years imprisonment. It was
found that the great majority of the population
was unaware of these changes. This clearly
demonstrates that the lack of public knowledge
puts limits on the ability of the legislator to in-
crease the general preventive effects through
increased rates of penalties.
Two observations should be made, however.
First, the level of awareness in the general
public is not a reliable indicator of the level of
awareness among those who need the message
most: the potential violators. The knowledge of
the average housewife or the middle-aged em-
ployee about penalties for robbery and bur-
glary is only of theoretical interest. The find-
ings suggest that those groups who might be
most likely to commit a certain offense have
the best knowledge of changes in the law.
Thus, 76 per cent of the population in adult cor-
rectional institutions gave correct answers to the
question about robbery with bodily injury,
while 65 per cent of college students could cor-
rectly state the penalty for -possession of mari-
juana (where no change had been made). Sec-
ond, since most people probably get their
knowledge through the reporting of criminal
cases in the news media, there may be a gradual
dissemination of the information over time, even
though the action of the legislature in raising the
penalty has gone unnoticed. There is a common
sense presumption that public perception will,
however imperfectly, reflect the actual severity
level and changes in same.
The law and the sentencing practices of the
court provide information about severity of
sanction-although plea bargaining practices
may lead to a mitigation of what would theo-
retically be expected. None of these sources
give any indication of the objective certainty
of sanction. The criminologist can compute fig-
ures on average risk for various offenses. Vic-
timization studies show, for example, that
about one out of three burglaries are reported
to the police."' And the Uniform Crime Re-
ports show that about 20 per cent of the reported
burglaries are "cleared by arrest", and that for
adult offenders about half of the arrests lead to
conviction. 2 This adds up to an average risk of
conviction of about 3 per cent, but it does not tell
much about the risk in individual cases.
The general public, or even the average
criminal, do not have such sources at their dis-
posal. They may take their clues from a vari-
ety of sources: folklore about crime, knowledge
about crimes which have or have not been
solved, information about police routines, and
so on. Most people probably give very little
thought to the problem before they are chal-
lenged by the interviewer from a public survey
institute. Moreover, a person thinking about
committing a crime is not interested in aver-
age risks, but in the risk he will himself en-
counter. If, for example, a man contemplates
committing a burglary, he will try to assess
the risk of being heard or seen by the neigh-
bors, or observed by a casual passer-by or cop
on the beat, or that there may be a burglar
alarm in the house, or that he will be
identified at a later time by his fingerprints.
And he will try to adjust his selection of vic-
tim and imodus operandi in order to minimize
all these risks. For a professional criminal this
kind of preparation ("casing") will play an
important part in his activity. 3
Thus, it can be seen that great caution must
be exercised in interpreting survey research on
perceptions of risk. For example, a British Gov-
ernment Social Survey interviewed young men
in the ages between fifteen and twenty-two.
8 4
Most of them greatly over-estimated their
chances of being caught, when their answers
were compared with average clearance rates,
but the criminally more experienced tended to
81 TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT,
supra note 21, at 17.
82 FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1972, at 31, 35
(1972).83 See, e.g., P. LETKEMANN, CRIME AS WORK
137-57 (1973).
s4 H. Wmcocx & 3. Sroxas, DETERRENTS TO
CRIME AMONG YOUTHS AGED 15 ro 21 (1968), as
quoted in N. WALKm, SENTENCING IN A RA-
TIONAL SOCIETY 63-68 (1969).
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be more optimistic, that is, Nigel Walker com-
ments, more realistic.8 5 Walker makes this the
starting point of some comments on the possi-
bility of improving the crime rate by increas-
ing the probability of detection:
So far as shop-breakings (and most other
acquisitive crimes) are concerned this is a
visionary's hope. The clear-up rate is so low
that it is over-estimated by all but a small
minority. To alter the estimates of a realistic
minority would require an enormous increase
in police efficiency; and to raise still further
the over-estimates of the majority seems
almost out of the quesiton.8 6
This conclusion may be too pessimistic. As
with severity there is a common sense pre-
sumption that the perception of risk will, how-
ever imperfectly, reflect actual police efficiency
and changes in such efficiency. Experiences
with the British drunken driver legislation
provides an example.8 7 To put it another way:
if people over-estimate the risk under present
conditions they may continue to over-estimate
the risk to the same degree if actual clearance
rates were changed.
Comparative survey research could be used
to explore how perceptions of severity and cer-
tainty of punishment vary with actual severity
and certainty. If a high degree of covariation
were found it would tend to disprove the hy-
pothesis that lack of information is a major
obstacle to the achievement of general preven-
tive effects. If, on the other hand, the research
showed that perceptions of severity and cer-
tainty, for all or some crimes, vary independ-
ently of the objective facts, this would provide
good reason for looking with scepticism towards
the current research on the effects of severity
and certainty on crime rates. Thus, compara-
tive survey research would represent an impor-
tant supplement to current comparative stud-
ies-a supplement which has not yet been
undertaken.
85 Whether there is an over-estimate of risk in
the individual case is hard to tell, since the risk is
so dependent on ability and caution. It has been
said that one of the striking things about offenders
is that they have "a magical belief in their own
cleverness, luck, or whatever they call it-often in
obvious contrast to the facts." Schmideberg, The
Offender's Attitude Toward Punishment, 51 J.
CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 328, 332 (1960).
86 N. WALKER, supra note 83, at 65.
87 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
On common sense grounds one would expect
that individual perceptions of the severity and
certainty of sanction play a role in the decision
to commit or abstain from crime. Some re-
search has been conducted on this question
using a comparison of (registered or non-reg-
istered) offenders with non-offenders.88 Some
correlations have been found, but they are dif-
ficult to interpret, since the question of tem-
poral sequence has not yet been solved. If we
find differences in the perceptions of offenders
and non-offenders, it is difficult to know
whether such differences preceded the offense
and thus entered into the process of motiva-
tion, or whether they are the result of the expe-
rience of the offenders.
Henshel has attacked previous comparative
research on deterrence because it has not taken
into consideration the necessary link between
criminal justice and deterrence: the percep-
tions of the public. "Logic would seem to re-
quire the position that most earlier deterrence
research must either be reanalyzed (where this
is still possible), interpreted far more narrowly
than its originators intended, or reluctantly, in
some cases, disregarded." 89
This would be correct if the main purpose of
the research had been to explore the potentiali-
ties of general prevention under conditions of
perfect public knowledge, or to find out how
much of this potential effect gets lost because
of lack of knowledge. These are certainly in-
teresting research goals, and may also have
some policy implications. But for legislators
and criminal justice agencies, the most impor-
tant question is what they can achieve under
the conditions of this world as it is presently
constituted. Imperfect public knowledge of the
criminal justice system is a factor that must be
accepted and taken into consideration. Re-
search concerning the effects of A (threat of
punishment) on C (crime rates) is not invalid
88 Claster, Comparison of Risk Perception Be-
tween Delinquents and Non-Delinquents, 58 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 80 (1967); Jensen, "Crime
Doesn't Pay": Correlates of a Shared Misunder-
standing, 17 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 189 (1969) ; Chiricos
& Waldo, Perceived Penal Sanction and Self-Re-
ported Criminality: A Neglected Approach to De-
terrence Research, 19 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 522
(1972).
S9 Henshel, Deterrence and Knowledge of Sanc-




because of ignorance of the intermediate link
B (public perception). But comparative survey
research of the type mentioned above may
serve to support or weaken the findings.
EXPERIMENT
"Experiments" of interest to the theory of
general prevention can be of several different
types. Law enforcement agencies, perhaps per-
suaded by a researcher, sometimes make exper-
imental changes in their practice in order to
study the effects of the change.99 Such field ex-
periments may give valuable insight, espe-
cially on the effects of variations in police ac-
tivities. Such experiments have been made in
order to assess the effects of different types of
traffic control or the effect of an increase in
the number of policemen or car patrols in a
given district.91 This is in fact a type of "be-
fore and after" research, differentiated only by
the research purpose underlying the change in
practice. In regard to variations in severity,
conceptions of evenhanded justice set narrow
limits for this approach.
9 2
In contrast to the field experiment there is
the traditional laboratory experiment, with ani-
mals or humans. As a rule this is too far re-
moved from the live setting of criminal justice
to be relevant for questions concerning the
general preventive effects of criminal law.
9 3
As a third category we have experiments
which are specifically designed to test theories
about general prevention in settings which are
sufficiently similar to the realities of the crimi-
nal justice system to justify some inferences.
Not much has been done of this kind, but one
recent study by Tittle and Rowe deserves
mention.94 Three sociology classes were orga-
90 See text accompanying note 77 supra.
91 For a survey see Wilson, Do the Police Pre-
vent Crime?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1974, § 6 (maga-
zine).
October 6, 1974, § 6.
92 See Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33
U. CHI. L. REv. 629, 649-53 (1966); Zimring,
Measuring the Impact of Pretrial Diversion from
the Criminal Justice Systen, 41 U. Ciai. L. REv.
224, 235-41 (1974).9 3 Even Barry F. Singer, in his highly informa-
tive essay on psychological studies of punishment
(Singer, supra note 5), underestimates the dangers
of drawing analogies from laboratory research to
real life.
9 Tittle & Rowe, Moral Appeal, Sanction
Threat, and Deviance: An Experimental Test, 20
SOCIAL PROBLEMtS 488 (1973).
nized around a series of eight weekly quizzes
worth ten points each. After the correct an-
swers had been explained the students were al-
lowed to calculate their own grades. Upon re-
turn of the fourth quiz the two experimental
groups were reminded that they were trusted
to grade their quizzes honestly and that they
had a moral obligation to be accurate. After
return of the seventh quiz they were told that
complaints about cheating had been lodged, so
it was necessary for the instructor to spot
check some of the quizzes for accuracy. Before
the self-grading of the last quiz began the
classes were told that the spot check had re-
vealed a case of cheating and that the person
was to be penalized. In fact all quizzes had
been graded by the instructor before the self-
grading, without the students knowing this.
The results can be summarized as follows.
There was a considerable amount of cheating
going on all the time; only five of 107 subjects
totally refrained from cheating during the en-
tire quarter. The moral appeal made upon re-
turn of the fourth quiz apparently had no ef-
fect on the level of cheating. The threat of
being caught and punished did have a signifi-
cant effect, and this effect was increased by the
information that one cheater had been caught
and would be penalized. Females were influ-
enced far more by the sanction threat than
were males. And students most in need of
points were least responsive to the sanction
threat; apparently their motivation for cheat-
ing was so strong that they were willing to
take greater risks.
STATISTICAL AND NON-STATISTICAL EVIDENCE
American research from the last decade rep-
resents the first great effort to attack the prob-
lem of general prevention by refined statistical
methods. This does not mean that there was a
total lack of evidence up to then. Although
there had been practically no systematic re-
search conducted, there were other sources of
information for anybody who was willing to
collect and make use of them: for example.
historical experience, day to day observations,
psychological introspection.
There has been a tendency among social sci-
entists to dismiss as "ancedotal," "impression-
istic," or "speculative," evidence which cannot
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be treated statistically and presented in nice ta-
bles with computed percentages and tests of
significance. In my view such evidence can be
perfectly convincing, although it does not lend
itself to broad generalization. In previous writ-
ings many examples have been presented,9 5 but
for present purposes only two will be men-
tioned.
The first is taken from Jerome Hall's classi-
cal treatise Theft, Law, and Society.
6 It
relates to the risk of detection and conviction
for automobile thefts. In Chicago the number
of automobiles reported stolen dropped sharply in
1934, and continued to drop in the following
years so that the annual average for the decade
1940-1950 was almost 90 per cent less than it was
in 1933. This fantastic decrease was preceded by
important changes in legislation and law en-
forcement. The Uniform Motor Vehicle Anti-
Theft Act, which introduced a system of regis-
tration certificates and a system of iden-
tification based on serial and motor num-
bers, made the trade in stolen cars much less
attractive. At the same time a specialized Auto
Theft Court was established, and the activities
of the police department and state's attorney in
this field were expanded. Is there any reason
to doubt that the changes in legislation and
law enforcement were a dominant factor in the
extraordinary decrease in this kind of crime?
Of course, the decrease in car thefts did not
necessarily mean a corresponding decrease in
the total amount of crime. Some offenders may
have turned to other, supposedly safer, kinds of
crime.
The second example is taken from the field
of white collar crime, and relates to the sever-
ity of sanction. In 1961 the federal govern-
ment obtained jail sentences against a number
of high level business executives who had en-
gaged in a conspiracy to fix prices in the
heavy electrical equipment business. Competent
observers testify that these sentences had a
profound impact in the business world, both as
a deterrent and as a moral eye-opener. The
Director of Operations in the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Justice Department said in an often
quoted statement:
95 
See PUNISHMENT AND DxETRRENcE, supra
note 7, at 10-28, 48-62, 74-76, 90-402.
963. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SocIETY 282-88
(1952).
No one in direct contact with the living real-
ity of business conduct in the United States is
unaware of the effect the imprisonment of
seven high officials in the Electrical Machin-
ery Industry in 1960 had on the conspiratorial
price fixing in many areas of our economy;
similar sentences in a few cases each decade
would almost completely cleanse our economy
of the cancer of collusive price fixing and the
mere prospect of such sentences is itself the
strongest available deterrent to such
activities0 r
This may be somewhat of an overstatement.
"White collar crime" is a vague label and it
cannot be taken for granted that criminal sanc-
tions are of the same importance for all of-
fenses comprised under the label. But at least
for much white collar crime it would be difficult
to deny that the threat of punishment will work
if there is a significant risk of detection and
conviction and a stern sanction, especially im-
prisonment with its moral stigma. The problems
in this field are of a different kind. First, are
we able to create a significant risk of detection
without hiring and training an army of highly
qualified agents of control? Second, are we
really willing to use the heavy sword of crimi-
nal justice against otherwise respected mem-
bers of society in cases of this kind, for exam-
ple, price fixing or tax fraud? It is much
easier for prosecutors and judges to overcome
their scruples against inflicting suffering and
disgrace when the offender comes from a
world different than theirs.
Introspection and general life experiences
are unreliable sources of knowledge when we
apply them to situations far from our own life ex-
periences, for example, where we speculate about
the motivational processes of murderers or
rapists. In other situations they may be quite
reliable. For example, there is little doubt that
the size of the parking fine and the efficiency
of enforcement has an influence on the fre-
quency of parking violations. This was true
even before Chambliss made his interviews
with faculty colleagues and thus provided "sci-
entific" or "empirical" evidence for the
proposition.9"
9 Spivack, as quoted in TASiK FORCE REPORT:
CRIME AND ITS ImPAcT, supra note 21, at 105.
See also Gels, Criminal Penalties for Corporate
Criminals, 8 CRIm. L. BULL. 377 (1972).
9s Chambliss, The Deterrence Influence of Pun-
ishment, 12 CRInE & DELINQUENCy 70 (1966).
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As a corollary of the tendency to underesti-
mate non-statistical evidence has gone a ten-
dency to place too much reliance on such statis-
tical studies as there may be, and to generalize
uncritically from their findings. The classical
example is the early studies on the death pen-
alty for murder, and the sweeping generaliza-
tions which were made on the basis of them.
We may commit the same error in regard to
current research, if we do not make clear the
limitations inherent in the various methodolo-
gies.
For example, the interrupted time series
analysis is one of the most reliable research
methods, provided one has the necessary data.
The method has been applied with great suc-
cess by Ross and others to explore the effects
of the British drunken driving legislation of
1967 on traffic accidents. 99 The situation pro-
vided ideal conditions for using the method:
excellent accident statistics, specifying week-
day and hour of accidents, an extraordinary
amount of publicity before the law went into
effect, representative figures on blood alcohol
in deceased drivers before and after the law,
and surveys on knowledge and attitudes among
drivers. Recently, Ross has used the same
method in determining the effects of the Nor-
wegian drunken driving law of 1936 and the
Swedish drunken driving law of 1941. Since
he is not able to find evidence for an effect by
analyzing the accident rates, he questions the
widespread belief that Scandinavian drunken
driving laws have an effect on driver behavior
and thus have contributed to road safety. 00 The
evidence for such effects is considered "scientif-
ically unacceptable." This, in my view, is an
attempt to utilize a certain research method in
a situation where conditions for its application
are unfavorable. When the drunken driving
legislation of the Scandinavian countries was
enacted, none of the circumstances which fa-
vored the use of the interrupted time series
analysis in the case of the British law were
present. In Norway in 1936 the number of
traffic fatalities was low (about 100 a year)
09 See notes 72-76 up ra.
'00 H. Ross, The Scandinavian Myth: The
Effectiveness of Drinking-and-Driving Legislation
in Sweden and Norway, September, 1974 (paper
presented to the Sixth Conference on Alcohol,
Drugs, and Traffic Safety, Toronto, Canada, Sep-
tember 8-13, 1974).
and only reported in the statistics on causes of
death. There were no statistics referring acci-
dents to week-day and hour. It is not known
how much publicity there was about the new
law, i.e., whether the new provisions were
common knowledge to drivers from the outset
or whether knowledge of the law, which today
is very high, developed gradually. There were
no representative post mortem examinations of
deceased drivers before and after the law, nor,
of course, were there any surveys on knowl-
edge and attitudes.
In 1941 the situation in Sweden was much
the same, and in addition there were the irreg-
ularities in traffic accidents due to the war.
Under these circumstances it would have been
surprising if a deterrent effect could have been
proved through analysis of traffic deaths. In a
discussion of the impact of the British law it
was stated that since the Scandinavian legisla-
tion dates so far back, it is impossible to dem-
onstrate statistically the impact it has had.101
If, as many people believe, much of the effect
of the drunken driving legislation in Scandina-
via is due -to the moral impact of the law, this
is something which depends on a long time
process which would not be discernible in acci-
dent statistics.
A further point should be mentioned here. It
may be that the type of people who normally
participate in public discussions on traffic
safety, tend to generalize from the effect they
know the drunken driving law has on their
own behavior and on the behavior of those in
their social circle, therefore overestimating the
impact of the law on other segments of the
population. Perhaps the effect of the law is
particularly strong among persons who would
in any case have limited their alcohol con-
sumption to moderate quantities and shown re-
sponsibility in their driving habits after drink-
ing.
The above should not be interpreted as a
position in favor of a common sense approach
as compared to a statistical approach. It is rec-
ognized that both approaches have their limita-
tions. Under favorable conditions statistical
methods can yield more reliable and detailed
information than the common sense approach.




But we do not always have the kind of data
which make use of statistical methods appro-
priate.102
For policy-making purposes, it would, of
course, be of great benefit if statistical research
could give some quantitative measure of what
effect a given change in certainty or severity
of sanction has on the crime rate. Tables of
correlation and regression coefficients and the
like do not convey any meaning to legislators,
judges and others who have to make the policy
decisions; the research has to be translated
into more understandable language. Some such
estimates have been offered in research papers
on cross-sectional research, and are mentioned
above. Gray and Martin suggested that halving
either certainty or severity of punishment will
tend to double the crime rate, and vice
versa.10 3 Ehrlich suggested that a 1 per cent in-
crease in expenditure on direct law enforcement
would result in about a 3 per cent decrease in all
felony offenses,' 0 4 and that one execution would
save somewhere between eight and twenty
lives. 0 5 But it is obviously too early to attach
much weight to such estimates. Application of
different statistical techniques gives different fig-
ures, and we have the problem of causality versus
correlation. Until these problems are discussed in
detail and a reasonable degree of consensus be-
tween competent research workers has been
achieved, any policymaker would justifiably be
reluctant to base his decisions on such figures.
DETERRENCE, POLICE CORRUPTION, AND
ORGANIZED CRIME
Police corruption and organized crime in the
United States have become matters of great
national concern. 1 6 Police corruption can, of
course, exist independent of organized crime,
for example, when a policeman takes a bribe
102 To mention one other example, few will doubt
that the Watergate affair will have an impact on
American political life, both as a deterrent and as
a moral "eye-opener." Whether the effects will be
transitional or establish a new tradition, we do not
yet know. But, while an historical follow-up in the
future will perhaps be able to shed some light on
the problem, cross-sectional research as well as
statistical time series analysis will be out of the
question.
103 Gray & Martin, supra note 39.
104 Ehrlich, Participation in Illegitimate Activi-
ties: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,
supra note 47.
105 As quoted by Tullock, supra note 31.
for closing his eyes to an individual offense. 0 7
Likewise, organized crime can exist without
corruption. But normally the two go hand in
hand. The President's Crime Commission
stated: "All available data indicate that orga-
nized crime flourishes only where it has cor-
rupted local officials." 10 Other committees
have come to the same conclusion. 09 When
police corruption exists in connection with or-
ganized crime it is often only one aspect of a
more widespread pattern of corruption in the
criminal justice agencies and the political life
of the community. A distinguished observer
has stated that "corruption by organized crime
is a normal condition of American local gov-
ernment and politics." 11o Neither politicians,
nor prosecutors or even judges are immune
from temptation."' The more widespread the
corruption has become, the more difficult it is
obviously to combat. Anybody reporting cor-
rupt activities may merely be telling his story
to one of the corrupted.
Police corruption and organized crime repre-
sent the most glaring failure of criminal law in
its general preventive function. The police
officer, the supposed guardian and enforcer of
the law, is himself involved in criminal trans-
actions. And the crime syndicate is engaging in
crime, not occasionally or yielding to sudden
impulse, as many offenders do, but in a premed-
itated and systematic manner.
But looked upon from a different angle these
phenomena, and especially the combination of
106 See Task Force Report: Organized Crime,
supra note 22; D. CRESSEY, THEFT OF THE NATION
(1969); 11 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE ch. 4 [hereinafter cited as CaMES OF
VIOLENCE]; 13 M. FURSTENBERG, VIOLENCE AND
ORGANIZED CRIME app. 18 (1969).
107 Roebuck & Barker, A Typology of Police
Corruption, 21 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 423 (1974).
100 TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME,
supra note 22, at 6.
109 11 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 104, at
200; 12 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 104, at
785-86.
110 Moynihan, The Private Government of Or-
ganized Crime, The Reporter, July 6, 1961, at 14
(as quoted in TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED
CRIME, supra note 22, at 6).
"Il See, e.g., the case mentioned in TASK FORCE
REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME_, supra note 22, at 6, in
which a state judge, a federal prosecutor, and a
racketeer were involved in a conspiracy to ob-
struct justice in connection with the sentencing of
a federal law violator.
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the two, offer an impressive demonstration of
the general preventive impact which the crimi-
nal law has when the machinery of justice is
working normally and properly. Why is it that
organized crime can only flourish in combina-
tion with corruption? Obviously because the
corruption of law enforcement takes the teeth
out of the law and makes the criminals feel
immune to investigation, prosecution and con-
viction.
In addition organized crime has another
method to achieve immunity from punishment.
The criminal law is a system of threats. The
crime syndicates create their own threat sys-
tem in order to keep discipline within the or-
ganization and intimidate possible informers
and witnesses outside the organization. This
threat system is competing with that of the
criminal law, and is often more efficient, be-
cause it is more ruthless and not hampered by
legal technicalities and ideas about due process
of law. The sanction is swift, certain and se-
vere, as called for by classical deterrence theory.
This further immunizes the higher ranks of the
organization who do not themselves take a
hand in the dirty work. The point is well illus-
trated by the answer of a drug peddler to a
state's attorney in Chicago who was trying to
get information on upper level peddlers:
"Well, Judge, what can you do? You can
give me a couple of years. I have been there
before. You can give me time. If I tell you and
it gets out, I would be dead before the week is
over." 112
Former Attorney General Robert F. Ken-
nedy testified before a Senate subcommittee in
1963 that the physical protection of witnesses
who had cooperated with the federal govern-
ment in organized crime cases often required
that those witnesses change their appearances,
change their names, or even leave the
country. 13 In planning the fight against orga-
nized crime, measures to safeguard prosecution
witnesses from retaliation therefore has an im-
portant place. It seems as if the crime syndi-
cate has become increasingly sophisticated in
regard to the use of force. The wholesale
gangland killings belong to the days of the
"1
2 See A. LINDESMiTH, THE ADDICT AND THE
LAW 40 (1965).13 See TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME,
supra note 22, at 1.
past. Today, they rely on the threat of force
and the occasional use of force as a lesson for
everyone to see. "Such inducement of fear has
gained the syndicate its ends just as effectively
as widespread force." 114
To sum up: organized crime has succeeded
in achieving immunity from punishment by
bribing law enforcement agents and by estab-
lishing its own system of deterrence. Accord-
ing to Cressey, despite the recent improvement
in the techniques of American police work, the
chances that a Cosa Nostra member will be
jailed for a crime are still much less than the
chances that he will be injured in an automo-
bile accident."15 Even people who may be hesi-
tant to give an affirmative answer to the ques-
tion, "Does punishment deter crime?," will
hardly dispute the crime promoting effect of
this neutralization or nullification of law en-
forcement. This, in fact, is just another way of
stating that a credible threat of punishment
does deter crime-at least some forms of
crime."1 6 For the theory of general prevention
experience about police corruption and orga-
nized crime has a similar demonstrative value
as situations where law enforcement is tempo-
rarily paralyzed by police strikes or other
events (as the arrest of the Danish police by
the German occupation forces during World
War 11)."17
RESEARCH AND CRIMINAL POLICY
Research alone does not lead to a policy.
Policy making involves judgments that may be
conscious or unconscious, and more or less ar-
ticulated. To form a policy means to apply a
114 13 CRIMtES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 104, at
201-02.
315 D. CREssY, ORGANIZED CRIME AND CRIMINAL
ORGANIZATIONS 20 (Churchill College Overseas
Fellowship Lecture No. 7, 1971).
116 The greatest source of income for organized
crime in the United States seems to be illegal
gambling. Gambling on a large scale is an activity
of considerable visibility, which cannot for long
remain unknown to the police; moreover, it is a
victimless crime, where enforcement is dependent
upon police initiative. For these reasons caution
should be shown in generalizing from present
experiences to forms of organized crime which
restrict themselves to crimes of lower visibility, or
with victims who might bring complaints.
1
1 7 
See PUNISH-MENT AND DETERRENCE, supra
note 7, at 16-17, 50-51, 128; Clark, What Happens
When the Police Strike, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1969, § 6 (magazine).
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set of value judgments to a set of factual as-
sumptions about the effects of alternative poli-
cies. In rare cases scientific research is able to
give clear answers in quantitative terms about
the consequences of our choices. This is a state
which we are far from reaching and perhaps
never will reach in the field of general preven-
tion. Up to now the factual assumptions in this
field have been based on common sense psy-
chology about how categories of people will
react under certain conditions-what Paul
Meehl has termed "fireside inductions." 118
Such fireside inductions can be more or less
well grounded. Factual knowledge of the prac-
tices and attitudes in the business world is, for
example, essential for an assessment of the ef-
fects of different criminal policies on white
collar crime, in the same way as knowledge of
lifestyles and attitudes among young ghetto
males may be important in other fields of
crime.
Systematic research on the general preven-
tive effects of punishment is still in its infant
stage, and up to now it has not fundamentally
changed the basis for policy decisions. But
some findings have evolved which may support
or weaken traditional assumptions or assist us
in making a choice between competing com-
mon sense assumptions.
With regard to certainty of punishment the
research up to now, seen in its totality, has
given support to the common sense assumption
that increased certainty of sanction will tend to
reduce the amount of crime. But the research
does not give us reliable estimates of what we
could expect in return for a greater investment
in law enforcement. Nor does it tell us
whether investment in law enforcement will
yield greater or smaller returns than a similar
investment in social measures directed towards
eliminating the causes of crime. Given the
lack of reliable data one is free to follow his
own inclinations.
The discussion has led to an emphasis on
perceptions of certainty rather than objective
certainty as the decisive factor. This suggests
that for law enforcement to achieve maximum
effectiveness, thought should be given to those
118 Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions:
Some Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 27 J.
Soc. Isstus 65 (1971).
clues which potential offenders make use of in
assessing the risk. But direct misinformation
should be avoided for ethical reasons, as well
as the potential backfire effect when exposed.
In a democratic society with a free press it is
difficult to regulate the flow of information in
such a way as to serve the ends of criminal
justice. The British drunken driving legisla-
tion gives an example where a high perception
of risk was created through great publicity
without any use of misinformation, but the ef-
fects wore off since enforcement lagged behind
expectations.
In regard to severity the common sense as-
sumption is that general preventive effects will
increase with increasing severity, until the
point is reached where the punishment is con-
sidered out of proportion to the crime and
therefore lacks community support. The re-
search gives some support for the view that
imprisonment has a general preventive effect
above that of other measures, not only for
white collar crime, but also for traditional
crime. On the other hand, the research sug-
gests that very long prison sentences give a
small pay-off. Both propositions are easy to ac-
cept from a common sense view. It seems
likely that increasing severity yields diminish-
ing returns and that a given number of prison
years will produce more by way of general
prevention if distributed as short sentences to
a greater number of offenders rather than as
long sentences to a small number of offenders.
For severity of sanction as well as for cer-
tainty the decisive factor is perceptions, not
the objective facts. A combination of providing
great publicity to legislation which increases
severity, and as little publicity as possible to
legislation in the opposite direction, therefore,
would tend to maximize the general preventive
effect. But a conscious policy in this direction
would meet with the same difficulties as men-
tioned above in regard to certainty.
With the collapse of the rehabilitative ideol-
ogy and the acceptance of the reality of gen-
eral prevention, the perspective on criminal
law and law enforcement changes. In my view,
rehabilitation as well as incapacitation has a
legitimate place in the criminal justice system,
but the primary foundation is general preven-
tion, combining the components of fear and
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moral persuasion, and keeping within the lim-
its prescribed by considerations of justice, de-
cency, and compassion. An appropriate state-
ment of the English jurist and philosopher H.
Hart, states this point clearly:
[The] primary operation [of punishment]
consists simply in announcing certain stand-
ards of behaviour and attaching penalties for
deviation, making it less eligible, and then
leaving individuals to choose. This is a
method of social control which maximizes
individual freedom within the coercive frame-
work of law in a number of different ways. x1 9
What I miss in this statement is an indica-
tion of the community condemnation inherent
in the criminalization, and the ensuing stigma
attached to the act.
It is often said that a belief in general pre-
vention leads to excessive severity. Recently,
this point of view has been expressed by
Cooper. He who sees crime control from a de-
terrence perspective, has no real choice: "The
way ahead is ever on and upward, in a word:
escalation. No matter that the deterrent is seen
not to work; the answer is always more and
bigger doses of the same." 120 Even when de-
terrence is viewed in a narrow sense, the logic
of this statement is less than convincing. In
policy decisions one must weigh costs against
benefits. The costs in this case consist of the
economic expense for society and the suffering
inflicted on lawbreakers and their families. The
benefits consist of the inhibition of the socially
undesirable acts labeled criminal. We do not
want to suppress crime at any cost. We have
to strike some balance on the basis of our fac-
tual assumptions and our value judgments. Of
course, a deterrence perspective can be com-
bined with callousness towards the suffering of
other people, or with strong retributive feel-
ings, or even serve as a convenient cloak for
hostility and aggression. But the quality of the
motives tells nothing about the validity of the
perspective; by the same token the good inten-
tions and warm hearts of many proponents of
the rehabilitative ideals do not tell anything
about the validity of their views.
119 H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
23 (1968).
120 Cooper, Crime Control and the Deterrence
Perspective, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 161, 173 (1973).
Since our knowledge of the effects of var-
ious levels of severity is so limited, it seems
reasonable in sentencing to attach much weight
to the feeling of what is a fair sentence for
this offense; fair in proportion to the gravity
of the offense and fair in proportion to the
sentences handed out for other offenders and
other offenses. It may be that a more lenient
system, which is accepted as fair and consist-
ent, has a stronger impact than a more severe
system which creates the impression of incon-
sistency and arbitrariness.'12 The disparities in
sentencing, together with the vagaries of plea
bargaining and the impossible task of the pa-
role boards in a system of indeterminate sen-
tences may be the most serious weaknesses of
criminal justice in the United States today.
It is difficult to say whether the unpredicta-
bility of such a system has a greater or lesser
fear-inspiring effect than does a more predicta-
ble system of fixed sentences, meted out by the
court in accordance with an established prac-
tice. A system of fixed and fairly uniform sen-
tences presupposes judicial review of sentenc-
ing and the ensuing development of a kind of
case law in sentencing. The main justification
for a system of this type, which is well
established in European countries, would be
to eliminate the fortuitiveness and injustice
of the present system, which has come under
heavy attack from American scholars and
practitioners.122 But perhaps, as a side effect,
the increased feeling of legitimacy under a
more consistent and uniform system, might en-
hance the general preventive impact of the
system.
We know that authoritarian regimes with
high police density and ruthless criminal jus-
tice are able to achieve a high degree of social
control, but other models may still be more at-
tractive. After a study tour in the Soviet
Union some years ago with two colleagues of
mine we came to accept the fact that the So-
viet rulers have been quite successful in com-
bating traditional crime, but also came to the
conclusion that we in the West
must face the fact that if we wish to have a
society with political democracy, free discus-
1 21 See notes 20-22 supra.
122 See, e.g., FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES.
LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
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sion, high tolerance towards deviant opinions
and deviant behavior, maximum safeguards
against unjustified interference with the indi-
vidual, and humane sanctions if intervention is
unavoidable-if we wish to have all this, part
of the price we have to pay may be a
higher crime rate than in an authoritarian
society.
123
In the Scandinavian countries, and even
more in the Netherlands, prison sentences are
generally much shorter than in the United
States, and there is much less disparity in sen-
tencing. In the Netherlands out of the 13,000
prison sentences handed down in 1970 only
346 were for one year or more and only thirty-
five for three years or more; more than two-
thirds were for less than three months. 24 The
number of prison sentences was slightly higher in
1970 than in 1963, but a tendency towards
shorter sentences brought the prison population
down about 20 per cent. In the same period there
was a 160 per cent increase in reported property
crimes, 'but only a 7 per cent increase in crime
against life and person. What the figures would
have been with unchanged severity we do not
know. It will be a fascinating experience to watch
how far one can go towards leniency without
having a serious effect on crime rates. Social con-
demnation can probably be expressed as well
in a system of short sentences as in a system
of long sentences, just as marks in school can
be graded as efficiently on a scale from 1 to 10
as on a scale from 1 to 100.125 But the direct
hardship and suffering obviously increases
with the length of the term as does the incapa-
citative effect. For dangerous or professional
criminals it may be difficult to dispense with
long periods of incarceration. And, of course,
what works in the Netherlands or the Scandi-
navian countries will not necessarily work in
the United States.
12-3 Andenaes, Bratholm, & Christie, Inntrykk
fra Kriminologi og Strafferetti Sovjetunionen, 57
NoRDisx TIDSSKRIFT FOR KRImiNALVIDENSKAB 105,
122 (1969).
124 These figures were provided by Professor
Alfred Heyder, University of Amsterdam. In ad-
dition to those included in the figures listed above,
several hundred deviant offenders (psychopaths)
were treated in special institutions. For a more
complete discussion see L. HULSAAN, Criminal
Justice in the Netherlands, in DELTA-A REviEw OF
ART, LIFE AND THOUGHT IN THE NETHERLANDS
7-19 (1974).
GENERAL PREVENTION AND DEVIANCE THEORY
To a member of the legal profession it has
always seemed odd that textbooks and readers
on criminology and deviance traditionally have
given so little attention to the general preven-
tive effects of the criminal law and criminal
justice. Concepts such as labeling and prisoni-
zation have been treated in great detail, thus
stressing the possible adverse effects of crimi-
nal justice, but criminal law as a restraining
factor has either been denied ("punishment
does not deter crime"), or more often, ignored.
Thorsell and Klemke have criticized the failure
of labeling analysts to examine the possibility
that labeling may result in deterrence as well
as in reinforcement of the deviant behavior.'26
The point is well taken; as stated by the au-
thors it "seems fair to say that, at this time,
the validity of the currently accepted hypothe-
sis that the labeling process typically reinforces
deviant behavior seems to rest more upon its
repeated assertion by labeling analysts than
upon a substantial body of empirical evidence
and carefully reasoned conclusions." 127 But
Thorsell and Klemke discuss the problem only
in relation to the future conduct of the individ-
ual deviant, that is, in terms of special deter-
rence. They do not enlarge the perspective to
encompass the labeling and stigmatizing proc-
ess, both within and without the criminal jus-
tice system, as a general deterrent.
28
Recently Tittle and Rowe have observed that
an adequate explanation of social behavior re-
quires attention to the pushes as well as the
restraints that govern conduct, but that most
work in the field of deviance within the past
four decades has placed a disproportionate em-
phasis on the push, or motivation, half of the
formula. 2 9 They even suggest that the major
factor in human behavior may be fear of sanc-
tion, and that many theories of behavior could
be integrated within a deterrence framework.
"Differential association" might be considered
125 PUNISH-MENT AND DETERRENCE, supra note
7, at 24-25, 56-57.
126 Thorsell & Klemke, The Labeling Process:
Reinforcement and Deterrent, 6 LAw & Soc'v REV.
393 (1972).
127 Id. at 396-97.
128 ANDENAES, The Future of Criminal Law, in
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE, supra note 7, at
164.
129 Tittle & Rowe, supra note 50, at 455.
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a condition which reduces fear of sanction;
being labeled could represent a condition dilut-
ing fear of sanctions, and so on.
This theory may place too high an expecta-
tion on the deterrence perspective as an ex-
planatory tool. However, deterrence is, no
doubt, one of the perspectives which can and
ought to be used in explaining human behav-
ior, with all of us on the receiving end. Our
surroundings (family, friends, colleagues,
bosses) will punish us with disapproval or even
rejection and isolation if we do not live up to
their standards. Nature will punish us with
physical hardship and even death if we do not
heed her warnings and take proper precau-
tions. The law will punish us with legal sanc-
tions, from the small parking fine to severe
penalties implying disgrace and suffering, if
we transgress its boundaries. This does not
mean that we go around in an eternal struggle
between desire and fear. We adjust. We take
into consideration the possibility of adverse
consequences. We acquire habits and lifestyles
which keep us reasonably within the prescribed
limits without any feeling of conflict and coer-
cion. In a word: we become socialized; and
law is one of the socializers. Only in situations
of crisis, or extreme temptation or provocation,
do most of us feel the conflict and the neces-
sity of making a conscious choice.
1975]
